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BACK TO THE LABORATORY WITH PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES: A FLORIDA RESPONSE
JAMES R. JORGENSON*
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
I. INTRODUCTION
With its denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, Miller v.
Illinois, and Perry v. Louisiana,1 the United States Supreme
Court, in a 4-3-2 decision, declined to revisit the issues which
Swain v. Alabama2 first presented to the Court. In Swain the
Court considered two questions relating to the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges: 3 one, will a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges be subjected to scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment; and two, if so, how can a de-
fendant make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination.
The Court held that, while a prosecutor's exercise of peremptories
could be successfully attacked under the equal protection clause, a
defendant must, in order to make out a prima facie case of invidi-
ous discrimination, show more than that the prosecutor exercised
his peremptory challenges to strike all blacks from the jury venire
in a particular defendant's case. The Court stated that "the defen-
dant must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use
of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time."4
The Court held that this burden was not met by showing that no
blacks had served on juries over a period of years in the absence of
evidence showing "when, how often, and under what circumstances
the prosecutor alone has been responsible for striking those Ne-
groes who have appeared on petit jury panels in [the county]." 5
* Judge, Third District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1981 to present. B.S. 1965, J.D. 1968,
Florida State University. This article incorporates substantial portions of the author's thesis
submitted for an LL.M. degree in Judicial Process received in 1984 from the University of
Virginia.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
2. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
3. Alabama utilized the struck-jury system. Id. at 210. Under this system, the venire is
first reduced by excuses and removals for cause. The attorneys then exercise their peremp-
tory challenges or strikes to remove veniremen until only the number needed to constitute a
full panel remains.
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 224.
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the
denial of certiorari in McCray, Miller, and Perry and suggested
that Swain should be reexamined in light of sixth amendment
standards.6 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Pow-
ell, agreed with Justice Marshall's appraisal of the importance of
the underlying issue of "whether the Constitution prohibits the use
of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group
from the jury, based on the prosecutor's assumption that they will
be biased in favor of other members of the same group."'7 Noting
that "further consideration of the substantive and procedural
ramifications of the problem by other courts [would] enable [the
Supreme Court] to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date,"
Justice Stevens concluded that "it is a sound exercise of discretion
for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in
which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this
Court.'"8
Florida is one of those "laboratory" states which is presently
confronting the peremptory challenge issue. In Neil v. State,9 the
Third District Court of Appeal certified to the Florida Supreme
Court a question of great public importance: "Absent the criteria
established in Swain v. Alabama . ..may a party be required to
state the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge?" 10 Sub-
sequent to the Neil decision the district court certified the identi-
cal question in Andrews v. State." The supreme court answered
the certified question with a qualified affirmative and, relying upon
state constitutional grounds, rejected Swain.2
The district court in Neil specifically rejected the constitutional
analysis advanced by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Wheeler" and the similar reasoning of the Massachusetts court in
Commonwealth v. Soares.14 In both Wheeler and Soares the
courts, relying upon state constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the right to a trial by jury, held that a defendant did not have to
6. McCray, 103 S. Ct. at 2441 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra note 55 and text ac-
companying notes 40-43 and 52-55.
7. McCray, 103 S. Ct. at 2438 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
8. Id. at 2438-39.
9. 433 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), quashed and remanded, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
10. Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
11. 438 So. 2d 480, 480 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), quashed and remanded, 459 So. 2d 1018
(Fla. 1984).
12. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 482, 486.
13. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
14. 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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meet Swain's "systematic use" burden-of-proof criteria to establish
a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination in the prosecu-
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges. According to these two
courts, a defendant 5 makes out a prima facie case and shifts the
burden to the prosecutor to show his peremptory challenges were
not being exercised solely on the basis of the prospective jurors'
race if he establishes: (1) that several members of a "discrete" or
"cognizable" group have been excluded; and (2) that there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that these persons were excluded by the prose-
cutor solely because of their group membership.' The Wheeler-
Soares analysis derives from principles announced in Duncan v.
Louisiana17 and Taylor v. Louisiana.18 These principles are dis-
cussed below.
The Florida Supreme Court declined to fully embrace Wheeler
or Soares but found an alternative to Swain was needed. 9 Relying
principally on People v. Thompson,20 the court established a new
test for trial judges to apply when confronted with an alleged mis-
use of peremptory challenges.2 1 Similar to the Wheeler-Soares
scheme, the test employs a burden-shifting construct. However, a
heavier burden is placed on a party who seeks to challenge his ad-
versary's use of peremptories under the Neil-Thompson test than
that placed on a party who seeks to challenge his adversary under
the Wheeler-Soares scheme.22
This article will reexamine Swain and attempt to point out some
of the factors which are relevant to a consideration of this difficult
issue. It is submitted that the Wheeler-Soares courts, by focusing
on the effect of peremptories upon jury demographics rather than
on the number of peremptory challenges, have confused intangible
issues of group bias with Taylor cross-section requirements. The
15. Both courts concluded that the state was equally entitled to a trial by an impartial
and representative jury and could, therefore, attack the defendant's exercise of his peremp-
tory challenges if such challenges were likely to have been based on group membership cri-
teria. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29; Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35.
16. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 764; Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
17. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying sixth amendment provision for jury trial to the states
by virtue of the fourteenth amendment).
18. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (requiring jury venires be drawn from a source fairly representa-
tive of the community).
19. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 485.
20. 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981). The supreme court's reliance on Thompson may
be misplaced in light of McCray, 443 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438
(1983), which implicitly overruled Thompson.
21. See infra text accompanying note 60.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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Wheeler-Soares courts gutted the peremptory challenge system
without giving thought to alternative methods which would en-
hance minority participation on trial juries.2 The Neil-Thompson
courts softened the impact of Wheeler-Soares but nevertheless
have taken a significant step in changing the role of peremptory
challenges in our system of justice.
A strong state policy of ensuring minorities the opportunity to
serve on juries does not necessarily require a total abandonment of
the peremptory challenge system.2' Because Florida uses a six-per-
son jury in all noncapital cases,26 consideration should be given to
the number of peremptory challenges available to the parties. 21 It
23. Both the California and the Massachusetts courts relied upon their state constitu-
tions to avoid collision with the rule established in Swain. See Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 767;
Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 515-16; see also State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(adopting the Wheeler-Soares rationale).
24. Younger, Something New Under the Sun: Unlawful Peremptory Challenges,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1982, at 27; see also Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and
the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982).
25. FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1983) and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270 provide: "Twelve persons shall
constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all
other criminal cases."
In a memorandum dated May 9, 1984, from M. David McGriff, Director of Research and
Systems Division, Administrative Office of the Courts, 11th Judicial Circuit, to Ignatius Car-
roll, Criminal Justice Coordinator, Metro-Miami Action Plan, Mr. McGriff reports a number
of statistics relating to jury composition. Mr. McGriff concludes that minorities are more
likely to be represented on juries of 12 than on juries of 6. For a 6-man jury, given an
estimated panel size of 30 (panels vary by judge between 25 and 35) and assuming that the
panel reflects the racial breakdown of the 80,000 pull (19.7% black, 80.3% white), the
probability of selecting, by random selection, an all-white jury is 21%. For a 12-man jury
(there were only 8 in the study, none of which were all white), given an estimated panel of
50 (they vary between 45 and 55) and again assuming that the panel reflects the same black
membership (19.7 %), the probability of selecting an all-white 12-man jury, by random selec-
tion, is 4%.
For further discussion of the effects of jury size on minority representation and jury re-
sults, see Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court,
and the Size of the Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1004, 1017-19, app. 1037, table 2 (1980);
Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size
Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 664-84 (1975).
26. FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1983) provides:
(1) The state and the defendant shall each be allowed the following number of
peremptory challenges:
(a) Ten, if the offense charged is punishable by death or imprisonment for
life;
(b) Six, if the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more
than 12 months but is not punishable by death or imprisonment for life;
(c) Three, for all other offenses.
(2) If two or more defendants are tried jointly, each defendant shall be allowed
the number of peremptory challenges specified in subsection (1), and the state
shall be allowed as many challenges as are allowed to all of the defendants.
Accord FLA. R. CrIM. P. 3.350.
1 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
is submitted that Neil should be augmented with a reduction in
the number of peremptories, the introduction of certain reporting
requirements, and a renewed recognition by trial courts of appro-
priate challenges for cause. If these additional steps are taken, mi-
nority participation will be enhanced without the necessity of in-
voking an awkward burden-shifting test. Neil would serve as a
safety net, but, for the most part, peremptory challenges would re-
main peremptory and thus continue to serve their traditional and
most useful role-assuring the parties that their jury is fair and
impartial.
II. Swain AND ITS AFTERMATH
Criticism of Swain was immediate and forceful. 7 Despite its
critics, Swain remains, if not the popular view, at least the prevail-
ing view in the majority of jurisdictions. S In Swain the Court ac-
knowledged that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to de-
mand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries
him.29 Nor is there any constitutional imperative requiring the fed-
eral or state governments to grant peremptory challenges." Never-
theless, the Court described the peremptory challenge as " 'one of
the most important of the rights secured to the accused' ",3' and
described its use by the prosecutor as necessary so that
" '[b]etween [the accused] and the state the scales are . . . evenly
held.' ",32 Regarding the nature of the peremptory challenge, the
Court observed that its essential nature "is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control. '3 3 The Court went on to state that "[i]t is no
less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to
legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, na-
tionality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury
27. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases:
The Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 135-39 (1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A
Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157
(1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
28. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977).
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 208.
30. Id. at 219.
31. Id. (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
32. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
33. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
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duty. ' 34 The question for trial counsel "is not whether a juror of a
particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one
from a different group is less likely to be."' 35 In order to make that
determination the voir dire in jury selection is wide-ranging. 6
The dissent in Swain, filed by Justice Goldberg, is frequently
overlooked.3 7 A fair reading of this dissent compels the conclusion
that the basic disagreement between the majority and the dissent
related to the state of the record with respect to the historic dis-
crimination against blacks on jury panels in Talladega County.
Justice Goldberg noted that "[o]nly where systematic exclusion has
been shown, would the State be called upon to justify its use of
peremptories or to negative the State's involvement in discrimina-
tory jury selection. 38 The dissent concluded that in an individual
case a prosecutor's motives in exercising peremptories are not sub-
ject to question or judicial inquiry nor is a minority defendant en-
titled to proportionate representation on a jury.39 These are the
same conclusions reached by the majority.
Subsequent to the Swain decision, the United States Supreme
Court considered Duncan v. Louisiana,40 which applied, for the
first time, the sixth amendment right to jury trial to the states
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice White stated, "Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon com-
munity participation in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence."41 The proposition that a fair cross section of a community
must be represented on a jury venire was forcefully driven home
by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana.42 In Taylor, the Court im-
posed the sixth amendment requirement that jury venires be se-
lected from a representative cross section of the community. The
fair cross-section requirement was qualified by Justice White when
he stated that
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 221.
36. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 121 (1983). See gener-
ally 3 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS ch. 51 (2d ed. 1982); JURY WORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES
(2d ed. 1983); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 25-47 (1980).
37. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 24, at 344-45.
38. Swain, 380 U.S. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
42. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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[i]t should also be emphasized that in holding that petit juries
must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the commu-
nity we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen
must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of
any particular composition . . .'
In an effort to avoid the alleged harshness of the Swain rule,
state supreme courts developed various alternative theories which
require a prosecutor to explain his use of the peremptory challenge
in certain instances. The first of these theories, developed in the
California case of People v. Wheeler," relied primarily on a Taylor
analysis and required a party to explain the use of its peremptory
challenges when the effect of the challenges was to exclude pro-
spective jurors based upon a presumed bias. 5 A similar approach
was taken by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Com-
monwealth v. Soares,46 wherein the court, relying extensively on
Wheeler, held that "exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of discrete groups, solely on the basis of bias presumed to
derive from that individual's membership in the group, contra-
venes the requirement[s] [of the Massachusetts] Declaration of
Rights." '47 Thereafter the court adopted the Wheeler burden-shift-
ing remedy which requires the alleged offending party to demon-
strate that members of the disproportionally excluded group were
not struck from panels on the basis of their group affiliation. The
force of the Soares opinion is magnified by the fact that the jury
foreman in that case was of the same race as the defendant.
Perhaps the best critical analysis of the impact of Wheeler and
Soares was made by Saltzburg and Powers, who stated:
These decisions differ from Swain in several important respects.
First, they assume that the peremptory challenge is intended to
be used only to eliminate specific bias from the jury. This as-
sumption signals a significant departure from the traditional un-
derstanding of the challenge as one exercised for any reason or for
no reason. Second, they assume that a jury from which some
ranges of presumed bias have been excluded is no longer impar-
tial, while Swain assumed that permitting unrestricted peremp-
43. Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
44. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
45. Id. at 764-65.
46. 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
47. Id. at 516.
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tory challenges furthered impartiality. Third, they presume that
the peremptory challenge can be subject to judicial control with-
out compromising its essential purpose-a proposition that Swain
rejected.4"
There is an obvious tension between the constitutional goal of an
impartial jury, enforced by the Taylor cross-section requirement,
and the use of peremptories by litigants which may result in the
diminution or disappearance of minority participants on trial ju-
ries. As noted above, the Wheeler and Soares courts addressed
that problem by requiring a party to explain the use of the pe-
remptory challenge when it appears that a cognizable group is be-
ing eliminated from the jury.49 In State v. Grady,0 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals rejected the Wheeler analysis, stating:
We refuse to adopt Wheeler on the ground that the test proposed
by the California court is vague and uncertain, and severely limits
the scope of peremptory challenges. If peremptory strikes can
only be exercised in a certain way, dependent on circumstances,
and subject to judicial scrutiny, they will no longer be peremp-
tory. We refuse to undertake such an alteration of the very nature
of the peremptory system."
Most federal courts have refused to extend Taylor's sixth
amendment cross-section analysis from the venire to petit juries.2
48. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 24, at 353.
49. Both courts point out that both the defendant and the prosecutor may require an
adversary to explain a peremptory challenge. This may be a hollow benefit for the prosecu-
tor in the event of an adverse ruling by the trial court because of its inherent un-
reviewability in the event of an acquittal. Nor does either court address fifth amendment
implications which might occur in the event the defendant were representing himself.
50. 286 N.W.2d 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
51. Id. at 612; see also Commonwealth v. Henderson, 438 A.2d 951 (Pa. 1981) (also re-
jecting Wheeler-Soares test as unworkable).
52. See, e.g., Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Childress,
715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 744 (1984).
Following the denial of certiorari in McCray, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983), McCray filed for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. The district court granted his petition, concluding that Swain should be modified in
light of Duncan and Taylor. Applying the Wheeler analysis, the court held that McCray
had made out a prima facie case of discrimination and that the state trial court's failure to
require the prosecutor to offer some reason for his challenges, other than race alone, necessi-
tated that McCray be afforded a new trial. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. McCray v.
Abrams, No. 84-2026 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1984). The Second Circuit is apparently the only fed-
eral circuit that has departed from Swain. In so doing, the court ignored comity and re-
jected Justice Steven's direction that the states should serve as laboratories in which the
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In United States v. Childress, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, while acknowledging that such an extension "has much logi-
cal and practical appeal, 5 3 concluded that Taylor and its sixth
amendment analysis had not in effect overruled Swain. 4 The court
determined that "the Supreme Court in Taylor expressly limited
the fair cross section of the community holding to the venire
",55
At least one commentator has suggested that Wheeler and
Soares were wrongly decided because the courts that decided those
cases failed to interpret Taylor properly. The commentator states
that
the principle of jury representation should be understood to mean
that certain characteristics of society that profoundly affect a
jury's verdict should not be distorted in the jury selection process.
The crucial aspect of the community that must be represented is
not the subgroup proportion, but the community's mean verdict
impact-the mean tendency of its members to influence a verdict
toward conviction or acquittal."
The theory of mean verdict impact, however, while undoubtedly
sound both in its logic and scientific rationale, does nothing to sat-
isfy a perceived community need for minority participation.5 7 The
need for increased minority participation on trial juries seems
clear. 58 How courts obtain this important societal goal is the ques-
tion that remains.
peremptory challenge issue receives further study. See supra text accompanying note 8.
53. Childress, 715 F.2d at 1319.
54. Id. at 1320.
55. Id. at 1319-20; see also Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d at 1219 n.14, wherein the court, citing
Childress, stated: "[W]e decline petitioner's invitation to extend the sixth amendment's
cross-section analysis under Taylor ... to the traverse jury itself. Taylor remains limited to
venires. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently considered the
issue in depth and was unwilling to read the sixth amendment so broadly."
For a discussion and criticism of Childress, see Case Comment, Deterring the Discrimina-
tory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CraM. L. REv. 477 (1984).
56. Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE
L.J. 1177, 1177 (1980).
57. See Andrews v. State, 438 So. 2d 480, 482 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Ferguson, J.,
concurring); see also Oglesby, Challenged: A Jury of One's Peers, Miami Herald, Jan. 26,
1984, at 29A, col. 1; Fisher, Dade Urges State To Help Keep Blacks on Juries, Miami Her-
ald, Mar. 7, 1984, at 2D, col. 1.
58. See Neil v. State, 433 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), quashed and remanded, 457 So.
2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 24, at 339; see also articles cited supra
note 57 and infra note 141.
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III. FLORIDA'S INITIAL RESPONSE: Neil v. State
In answer to the certified question posed by the Third District
Court of Appeal in Neil, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
Swain and found that an alternative was needed. The court explic-
itly held "that the test set out in Swain is no longer to be used by
this state's courts when confronted with the allegedly discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges. ' 59 Borrowing heavily from Peo-
ple v. Thompson, the court established a new test for the guidance
of trial courts:
The initial presumption is that peremptories will be exercised in
a nondiscriminatory manner. A party concerned about the other
side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection
and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are
members of a distinct racial group and that there is a strong like-
lihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race.
If a party accomplishes this, then the trial court must decide if
there is a substantial likelihood that the peremptory challenges
are being exercised solely on the basis of race. If the court finds
no such likelihood, no inquiry may be made of the person exercis-
ing the questioned peremptories. On the other hand, if the court
decides that such a likelihood has been shown to exist, the burden
shifts to the complained-about party to show that the questioned
challenges were not exercised solely because of the prospective ju-
rors' race. The reasons given in response to the court's inquiry
need not be equivalent to those for a challenge for cause. If the
party shows that the challenges were based on the particular case
on trial, the parties or witnesses, or characteristics of the chal-
lenged persons other than race, then the inquiry should end and
jury selection should continue. On the other hand, if the party
has actually been challenging prospective jurors solely on the ba-
sis of race, then the court should dismiss that jury pool and start
voir dire over with a new pool.60
To the extent that Neil and Thompson require parties to explain
the use of their peremptories, they are subject to the same criti-
cism to which Wheeler and Soares are subject.61
Having established the test to be used by trial courts, the court
limited the scope of its decision to distinctive racial groups rather
than the broad group categorizations found in Wheeler and
59. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486.
60. Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted).
61. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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Soares. The applicability of the decision to religious, ethnic, sex-
ual, or other grounds of group bias is left open to be determined on
a case-by-case basis.62 The court departed from Thompson, and
followed Wheeler and Soares, by holding that both the state and
the defense may challenge the allegedly improper use of perempto-
ries.6 3 However, the court agreed with Thompson that
the exclusion of a number of blacks by itself is insufficient to trig-
ger an inquiry into a party's use of peremptories. It may well be
that the challenges were properly exercised but that that fact
would not be apparent to someone not in attendance at the trial.
The propriety of the challenge, however, might be readily appar-
ent to the judge presiding over the voir dire. We emphasize that
the trial court's decision as to whether or not an inquiry is needed
is largely a matter of discretion.6 4
Although Neil represents a significant departure from prior Flor-
ida practice and invests the trial courts with broad (and perhaps
unreviewable) discretion in matters regarding alleged abuse of pe-
remptory challenges, several questions remain unanswered. Given
the court's acceptance of the proposition that the exclusion of a
number of members of a distinct racial group by itself is insuffi-
cient to trigger an inquiry regarding peremptory challenges, the
question then becomes what must an aggrieved party show to sat-
isfy a trial court there is sufficient evidence to trigger a Neil in-
quiry. Under Wheeler and Soares the mere fact that a number of
persons of a distinct group have been excluded seems sufficient;
however, both Neil and Thompson require that something more be
shown. 5
Also left unanswered is the question of the appropriate response
once the trial court has concluded that the burden shifts to the
opposing party to explain the questioned challenges. Although the
court states that the reasons given in response need not be
equivalent to those for a challenge for cause, a mere showing that
the challenges were based on (1) the particular case on trial, (2)
the parties or witnesses, or (3) characteristics of the challenged
persons other than race, would not be efficacious. 6 In addition, no
standards are provided in Neil which would guide the trial court in
62. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487.
63. Id. But see supra note 49.
64. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487 n.10.
65. Id.; People v. Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 755 (App. Div. 1981).
66. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487.
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the exercise of its discretion regarding the burden of proof to be
met by a challenged party. The court did not indicate whether the
evidentiary standard would be a mere preponderance, more likely
than not, or clear and convincing. An absence of effective stan-
dards will virtually preclude appellate review by the district courts.
It is clear that Neil has vested trial judges with broad discretion
when dealing with the alleged abuse of peremptory challenges. The
unanswered questions in Neil will need to be fleshed out by subse-
quent decisions. Indeed the court invited further refinement when
it stated, "It may even be possible that, on the peculiar facts of a
particular case, no member of some distinct group could be impar-
tial. If this occurs, an attorney should be able to state with cer-
tainty that this is so and that peremptories have been exercised
because of empathy or bias." 7 This observation by the court seems
to run counter to its express rejection of Swain and the jurispru-
dential theories implicit in Wheeler and Soares.
Neil squarely rejects Swain and provides new methods for trial
courts to employ when addressing the difficult issue of peremptory
challenge abuse. The discussion which follows will suggest that the
court, through its rulemaking power, can further reduce the ten-
sion between the goals of minority participation on trial juries and
the ability of trial counsel to select juries with a minimum of inter-
ference by the courts.
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN FLORIDA
Jury trials in Florida are governed by constitutional mandate, 6
statutory provisions,69 and rules of court.70 The exercise and num-
ber of peremptory challenges in both civil71 and criminal 72 cases
are controlled by statute and rule of court.73 The use of the pe-
67. Id. (footnote omitted).
68. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall.
have the right ... to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where
the crime was committed." Id. art. I, § 22 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be
secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer
than six, shall be fixed by law." Id. art. III, § 11(a)(5) provides: "There shall be no special or
general law of local application pertaining to ...petit juries, including compensation of
jurors, except establishment of jury commissions .
69. FLA. STAT. ch. 913 (1983).
70. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.251-.360.
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1983); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350.
73. Although the focus of this article is primarily on criminal cases, the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges in civil cases is also a significant issue. See City of Miami v. Cornett,
No. 81-85 (Fla. 3d DCA opinion filed Jan. 29, 1985); Ober, How Peremptory Is a Peremp-
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remptory challenge is well rooted in Florida jurisprudence.74 The
control of the voir dire examination is exclusively a judicial respon-
sibility.75 The time and extent of voir dire is properly supervised
by the trial judge,76 who is the arbiter of a juror's fitness to serve77
and the superintendent of the construction of the jury panel.78 As
the Florida Supreme Court stated in Cross v. State,79 "selection of
a jury to try a case is a work which devolves upon the court. [Its]
purpose is to secure such jurors as are qualified for jury service and
who are without bias or prejudice for or against the parties in the
cause." 80 The trial court's discretion with respect to the latitude
given the parties in examining jurors is quite broad. 1 It is clear,
however, that a failure to permit inquiry of a prospective juror re-
garding racial bias is error.82
While the manner in which peremptory challenges are made has
remained consistent,82 the number of peremptory challenges al-
lowed has not been so firmly fixed. Early Florida law permitted a
defendant twenty peremptory challenges in capital cases and the
state, five; in noncapital felonies a defendant had five peremptory
challenges and the state, two. In misdemeanor cases the defendant
had three peremptory challenges and the state, two.84 The statu-
tory number of peremptories remained the same until 1891 when,
pursuant to legislative direction, a revision commission submitted
comprehensive revisions which, among other changes, materially
affected the number of peremptory challenges. 5 The revisers, ac-
knowledging their charge to simplify, arrange, and consolidate the
statutes, while abstaining from making changes in statutes which
concern matters of public policy, nevertheless reduced the number
of challenges to ten for each side in capital cases, five for each side
tory Challenge?, 32 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 15 (1981).
74. Mann v. State, 3 So. 207 (Fla. 1887).
75. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976).
76. Blackwell v. State, 132 So. 468, 473 (Fla. 1931).
77. Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
78. Walsingham v. State, 56 So. 195 (Fla. 1911).
79. 103 So. 636 (Fla. 1925).
80. Id. at 637.
81. Essix v. State, 347 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
82. Pinder v. State, 8 So. 837 (Fla. 1891); see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524
(1973).
83. Grant v. State, 429 So. 2d 758, 759-60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also Edge v. State,
455 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (Cowart, J., concurring).
84. J. MCCLELLAN, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FROM 1822 TO 1881 ch.
89, § 9, at 446 (1881) (codifying Act of Feb. 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 7, 1877 Fla. Laws).
85. See Letter from Governor Francis P. Fleming to the Florida State Legislature (May
14, 1891), reprinted in FLA. H.R. JOUR. 635 (1891) (transmitting revised statutes).
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in all other felonies, and three for each side in misdemeanors.86 In
making these dramatic changes in the number of allowed peremp-
tory challenges, the revisers went beyond their charge. The legisla-
ture nevertheless accepted the revisions and published them as
part of the revised statutes of 1892. No explanation for these revi-
sions can be found in the legislative history. A subsequent amend-
ment occurred in 1939 providing for ten peremptory challenges for
each side in capital and life felonies and increasing by one for each
side the number of peremptories for all other felonies.8 7
As a consequence of Florida's selection as a pilot state to imple-
ment the American Bar Association (ABA) standards for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, 88 both the Florida legislature and
the Florida Supreme Court have engaged in substantial revisions
of the statutes and rules of criminal procedure.8 9 The Florida legis-
lature recognized that the statutory provisions regarding the num-
ber of peremptories available to the parties in criminal cases were
redundant in light of court rule.90
Pursuant to its constitutional authority,91 the Florida Supreme
Court, in furtherance of the ABA standards, published new and
amended rules of criminal procedure.9 2 Justice Adkins filed a spe-
cial concurrence outlining the difference between substance and
procedure. Noting that "[t]he entire area of substance and proce-
dure may be described as a 'twilight zone,'" Justice Adkins stated,
"Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner,
86. See Letter from Revisers to Governor Francis P. Fleming (May 14, 1891), reprinted
in FLA. H.R. JOUR. 635-38 (1891).
87. Ch. 19554, § 189, 1939 Fla. Laws 1300, 1347.
88. Progress Report of Section of Criminal Law in Connection with Its Responsibility
for Implementation of ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 8 AM.
ClIM. L.Q. 178 (1970).
89. See Ervin, ABA Standards Give Accused Lawful Rights; Assure Public of Speedy
Enforcement, 44 FLA. B.J. 20 (1970).
90. Ch. 70-339, § 87, 1970 Fla. Laws 989, 1034 (drafter's comment: "Although the subject
of the proposed section is covered by the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1.270), it can be
argued that this is a substantive right and should be retained as a statute."). But see Wilson
v. State, 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1974) (holding number of peremptory challenges allowed is
procedural in nature).
91. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) provides:
The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts
including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative supervision of
all courts, the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceeding when the
jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked, and a requirement
that no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought.
These rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the
membership of each house of the legislature.
92. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
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means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party en-
forces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
'Practice and procedure' may be described as the machinery of the
judicial process as opposed to the product thereof. ' 93 This defini-
tion is not easy to apply, and the line between legislative and judi-
cial authority remains difficult to draw.94 Justice Adkins' charac-
terization of the difference between substance and procedure was
approved without dissent when the court construed the constitu-
tionality of legislation bearing upon the regulation of voir dire ex-
amination during civil trials. 5 In its clarification opinion the court
stated, "The adoption as rules of the Court of all statutes which
have not been superseded or may be in conflict with the rules is
primarily a matter of convenience or administrative expediency.
Such adoption avoids the question of whether a matter lies within
the field of substantive law or procedural law." 96 The court went
on to state:
The fact that this Court may adopt a statute as a rule does not
vest the Legislature with any authority to amend the rule indi-
rectly by amending the statute. In other words, an attempt by
the Legislature to amend a statute which has become a part of
rules of practice and procedure would be a nullity.9
Other statutes impinging on the court's rulemaking power have
been dealt with similarly." The court has not, however, used its
rulemaking power in a manner which would engender discord be-
tween it and the legislature. Following its holding that the legisla-
tion relating to civil voir dire was a nullity, the court approved a
change in the rules of civil procedure which effectively accom-
plished the purpose of the legislation." The legislature, in turn,
repealed all the legislation regarding peremptory challenges, chal-
lenges for cause, and oral examination of jurors during voir dire in
93. Id. at 66 (Adkins, J., concurring).
94. See Note, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone
Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 87 (1971).
95. See In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla.
1973).
96. Id. at 205.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Avila South Condo. Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Hunt-
ley v. State, 339 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1976); Swan v. State, 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975); Benyard v.
Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975).
99. Compare ch. 73-72, 1973 Fla. Laws 126, with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(b).
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civil cases.100
It is clear that, although legislation affecting the method and
manner by which trial jurors are examined and challenged would
be a nullity, 10 1 the court will pay close attention to the public pol-
icy declarations of the lawmakers:
[C]ommentators have recognized that both court and legislature
can make necessary contributions towards fair and efficient court
procedure: the court can better regulate the details of rules and
change them more easily to fit changing conditions; the legislature
can establish general policy and act as a check upon the court.'0 2
V. JURIES OF SIX AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
It is not the function of this section to revisit the debate gener-
ated by the Supreme Court's approval of six-person juries in Wil-
liams v. Florida.'03 The use of six jurors to decide serious cases is
hardly a novel approach in Florida. Williams merely reaffirmed
law that had existed in Florida since 1877104 and was approved by
the Florida Supreme Court in the same year in which it was
passed. 0 5 The genesis of Florida's use of a six-person jury was un-
doubtedly its sparse population and rural economy, compounded
by the fact that women were not allowed to serve on juries.' Al-
though Florida is no longer sparsely populated, nor its economy
agrarian, it continues to use a six-person jury in cases affecting
both property and liberty interests. 0 7 The discussion which follows
will suggest that the Wheeler-Soares rationale focuses on the
wrong critical issue: It is not the manner in which peremptories are
exercised, but the number of peremptories available, which affects
the cross-section requirement imposed by Taylor. Specifically, an
overabundance of peremptory challenges permits the parties to de-
feat the cross-section goal of Taylor.0 8
100. See ch. 73-333, § 24, 1973 Fla. Laws 828, 840 (repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 53.011, .021,
.031, .051 (1971)).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 71-82.
102. Note, supra note 94, at 102 n.158 (quoting 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 776, 786 (1968)).
103. 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and the authori-
ties collected id. at 231 n.10.
104. Ch. 3010, § 6, 1877 Fla. Laws 52, 54.
105. See Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877).
106. See Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, but Are
They Fair?, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 402 (1971).
107. See FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1983). But see id. § 73.071 (12-person jury required in
condemnation cases).
108. See 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-2.6(a) & commentary at 62-63
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Selection of an unbiased trial jury is a function of the court"0 9
and is not the function of trial counsel. Belli suggests that
[trial counsel] has no duty to select a panel which is the most
objective. Indeed, he selects the panel which he thinks is the most
unobjective, the most favorable to his side. (In the long run, how-
ever, this gives an objective jury as the other side will strike ju-
rors who are not favorable to it and eventually a good jury is
chosen.)"'
In most jurisdictions, including Florida,"1 prospective jurors are
initially challenged for cause." 2 If the voir dire has been as wide-
ranging and probing as that suggested in Swain, trial counsel will
be able to employ appropriate challenges for cause upon which
trial courts can make rational rulings. 113 Given a substantially un-
biased venire the need for a large number of peremptory chal-
lenges is considerably reduced.
Florida presently permits the exercise of ten peremptory chal-
lenges for each party in a capital or life felony case and six per-
emptories for each party in all other felonies."' Thus, in a prosecu-
tion for a noncapital life felony, a party, through the use of all
available peremptories, can affect jury composition by striking up
to one and two-thirds panels. Neither the state nor the defense
should have the power to erode the demographics of a panel to this
extent. 15 Although it is true that liberty interests are generally
(and rightfully) regarded as more important than the interests of
civil litigants, the civil bar continues to successfully try exceedingly
complex cases involving large sums of money to juries of six per-
sons with the benefit of only three peremptory challenges per
side." '
Florida courts have not been reluctant to examine the compe-
tency of a juror challenged for cause. In announcing a standard for
weighing the potential partiality of a juror, the Florida Supreme
(2d ed. 1980).
109. See Cross v. State, 103 So. 636, 637 (Fla. 1925).
110. M. BELLI, supra note 36, at 428.
111. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.330.
112. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 139-45.
113. But see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529-34 (1973) (partial dissents of
Douglas and Marshall, JJ.).
114. See FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1983).
115. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 160.
116. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(d).
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Court stated in Singer v. State 17 that
the true test to be applied should be not whether the juror will
yield his opinion, bias or prejudice to the evidence, but should be
that whether he is free of such opinion, prejudice or bias or,
whether he is infected by opinion, bias or prejudice, he will, nev-
ertheless, be able to put such completely out of his mind and base
his verdict only upon the evidence given at the trial."'
Other Florida appellate courts have indicated a willingness to
make a thorough search of the voir dire record in an effort to in-
sure the proper disposition of trial court rulings regarding chal-
lenges for cause. In Leon v. State,"" the court reversed a burglary
conviction, restated the Singer test, and then noted that "[w]here
there is any reasonable doubt as to a juror's possessing the requi-
site state of mind so as to render an impartial verdict, the juror
should be excused, . . . and the defendant given the benefit of the
doubt ... ."I1o The court went on to hold that it is error for a
trial court to force a party to exhaust its peremptory challenges on
persons who should be excused for cause.' 2 ' The willingness of
Florida's appellate courts to comb voir dire records'22 should be a
sufficient basis to protect the interests of the litigants and at the
same time permit the Florida Supreme Court to reduce the num-
ber of available peremptory challenges.
A reduction in the number of peremptory challenges would not
only avoid the necessity of invoking the awkward burden-shifting
criteria found in Neil but would also have the salutory effect of
preventing litigants from materially altering the jury demography.
Challenges, whether peremptory or for cause, are a vindication of a
right to reject, not to select, a juror. 2 3 No party has a right to in-
sist upon a jury of a particular composition. 24 Focusing on real
117. 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
118. Id. at 24.
119. 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
120. Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 9 Fla. L.W. 2468 (3d DCA Nov. 20, 1984); Plair v.
State, 453 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Skipper v. State, 400 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 420 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982); Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
123. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887); see also Young v. State, 96 So. 381, 382
(Fla. 1923); Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the
Criminal Law, 44 U. Pirr. L. REv. 673, 681 (1983).
124. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261, 284 (1947), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972)).
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bias through the challenge for cause, coupled with a corresponding
reduction in peremptory challenges, will have the additional bene-
fit of giving the courts issues with which they can deal instead of
leaving them to tread into lofty areas of statistical decision the-
ory. 2 5 If the "laboratory" states are going to generate the discus-
sion and data that the United States Supreme Court will use when
it revisits the issues presented in Swain, the issue for consideration
should be real, rather than imagined, bias.
There will always be cases in which a lawyer or a litigant con-
cludes that a particular venire person who cannot be eliminated by
means of a challenge for cause will not be fair when considering his
case. That fear, whether ill-founded or not, is the proper reason for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge.' A reduction in the num-
ber of peremptory challenges available would make them more val-
uable in the hands of the parties, and their use would be accord-
ingly husbanded. 12 7
VI. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Sections II and V of this article have identified the misplaced
focus of the Wheeler-Soares rationale and have suggested that a
reduction in peremptory challenges, coupled with a strict compli-
ance with the Taylor cross-section requirements, would enhance
minority participation on juries. Such a proposal contemplates that
trial courts will be sensitive to challenges for cause.'2 8 Little guid-
ance is available from other jurisdictions which would be helpful in
determining the appropriate number of peremptory challenges.' 29
The federal rules currently provide for twenty challenges for each
side in capital cases, six challenges for the government in felonies,
and ten challenges for the defendant in felonies.' ° An effort to
amend the federal rules has been rejected by Congress.' The al-
ternative of an affirmative action program for juries destroys ran-
125. See, e.g., Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966). But see Saks, Ignorance of Science Is
No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18.
126. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
127. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 169 (recommending reduction in number of
available peremptory challenges).
128. See supra text accompanying note 113.
129. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 281-84 (app. D, Number of Peremptory Chal-
lenges and Method of Voir Dire).
130. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
131. See Note, The Defendant's Right To Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Pe-
remptory Challenge, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1770, 1774 n.37 (1979).
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domness and, in any event, is unconstitutional." 2
Although this article recommends a substantial reduction in the
number of peremptory challenges available to the parties, in crimi-
nal cases the trial courts should be vested with discretion to grant
additional peremptory challenges in exceptional cases. The grant-
ing of extra peremptory challenges on motion of the state was held
to be reversible error per se by the First District Court of Ap-
peal.13 The Florida Supreme Court subsequently amended the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for additional chal-
lenges on motion of either party."" If the court accepts the recom-
mendations made herein, the court should make it clear that the
effect of the rule is to include single-count as well as multi-count
trials.1 35 The timing of such a request should be in advance of trial
so that the parties will know the exact number of challenges avail-
able. The discretion to grant additional peremptories seems partic-
ularly appropriate in highly publicized cases.136
With the exception of isolated cases, there is an apparent ab-
sence of data regarding jury demographics. 3 7 Although there are
discrete studies regarding minority participation on trial juries, 38
there is no systematic collection of data at the state or national
levels regarding the inclusion of minorities on jury venires or jury
panels. We simply do not know with any degree of precision the
132. See generally Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1966); State v. Solva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 270 (1980); Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK
L.J. 80 (1973); Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970).
133. See Sanders v. State, 328 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1184
(Fla. 1976).
134. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1261 (Fla. 1977);
see also 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 108, § 15-2.6(a) ("the trial
judge should be authorized to allow additional peremptory challenges when special circum-
stances justify doing so").
135. See Moore v. State, 335 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
136. See, e.g., Comment, The Discretionary Power To Grant Additional Peremptory
Challenges in Highly Publicized Criminal Trials: Securing a Fair and Impartial Trial, 25
BUFFALO L. REV. 545 (1976).
137. Letter from Kenneth Palmer, Deputy Administrator for Programs, Florida State
Courts System, to the author (Feb. 10, 1984) (acknowledging no studies regarding jury com-
position in Florida); Letter from G.T. Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies of the
National Center For State Courts, to the author (Feb. 13, 1984) (acknowledging no data
regarding jury demography available at federal, state, or local levels). See also Comment,
The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge To Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A
Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 CIN. L.
REV. 554, 561 (1977).
138. See Benokraitis, Racial Exclusion in Juries, 13 J. APPLIED BEHAVORIAL Sci. 29
(1982).
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extent of the perceived problem. If there is indeed institutional
discrimination, the institution should act to prevent it.'
The need to refocus on the peremptory challenge and minority
juror participation is perhaps best illustrated by a recent trial in
Miami, Florida. In State v. Alvarez,'" an all-white jury found the
defendant, a white Hispanic police officer, not guilty of manslaugh-
ter by culpable negligence in an incident resulting in the death of a
young black male. The thirty-person venire included four blacks.
Two of the potential black jurors were excused for cause, and two
were peremptorily challenged by the defendant, resulting in an all-
white jury. Community concern focused upon the peremptory chal-
lenge issue.14 ' Appeals to local legislative bodies manifested the
community concern. 42 The Dade County Commission responded
by approving a resolution calling upon the state legislature to en-
act legislation which would change the jury selection process so as
to make jury panels more representative of community struc-
ture. 43 Editorial support for reexamination or abolition of the pe-
remptory challenge was an additional consequence of the Alvarez
trial. 4 Although the first legislative expression of dissatisfaction
139. See generally Benokraitis & Griffin-Keene, Prejudice and Jury Selection, 12 J.
BLACK STUD. 427 (1982).
140. No. 83-3972 (Fla. Dade Co. Cir. Ct. verdict entered Mar. 15, 1984).
141. See supra note 57; Baird, Practice of excluding minorities from juries is put on
trial at FIU, Miami Herald, Feb. 9, 1984, at 6D, col. 1; Fabricio, Blacks deserve to be a part
of judicial process, Miami Herald, Mar. 17, 1984, at 1B, col. 1; Kennedy, In the eye of the
storm: Priest struggles to keep lid on Miami tension, The Voice, Vol. XXXI, No. 54, Mar.
9, 1984, at 1. Other communities have expressed identical concerns. See Frantz, Many
blacks kept off juries here, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 5, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
142. See Letter from Msgr. Bryan 0. Walsh, Chairperson, Metropolitan Dade County
Community Relations Board, to the Dade County Commission (Mar. 5, 1984) (calling for
Commission support for a change in jury selection process that would result in juries more
representative of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community).
143. See Metropolitan Dade County Commission Resolution No. R-237-84 (adopted
Mar. 6, 1984). Statistics gathered in the 11th Judicial Circuit from January through June of
1984 indicate that 23% of all jurors were black and 81% of all juries during that period
included at least one black juror. Memorandum from M. David McGriff, Director of Re-
search and Systems Division of the Administrative Office of the Courts, 11th Judicial Cir-
cuit, to Ignatius Carroll, Criminal Justice Coordinator, Metro-Miami Action Plan (July 25,
1984); see also supra note 25.
144. See The Challenge, Miami Herald, Mar. 17, 1984, at 32A, col. 1 (calling for reexam-
ination of the use of peremptory challenges by lawyers); Hampton, Abolish Peremptory
Challenges, Miami Herald, Mar. 18, 1984, at 2E, col. 3 (calling for the abolition of the pe-
remptory challenge). But see Freedberg & Macari, Circuit Court jury system is racially
balanced, Miami Herald, July 15, 1984, at 1A, col. 2; Bias on the Jury, Miami Herald, July
21, 1984, at 30A, col. 1 (computerized study showing that Dade County's circuit court jury
system is racially balanced as discriminatory practices by prosecutors tend to be offset by
defense attorneys excluding a highly disproportionate number of whites).
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with the peremptory challenge system, which focused primarily
upon challenges exercised by the state, failed, 45 additional legisla-
tion will undoubtedly be offered during the 1985 session of the
Florida legislature.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Florida Supreme Court has partially ad-
dressed the peremptory challenge issue. Additional attention with
respect to the method and manner in which peremptory challenges
are exercised will serve the cause of justice and satisfy the litigants
and the populace that their cases are being fairly tried. Whether
the impetus for change in the system is legislatively or judicially
initiated is of little consequence. This article has noted that there
is only limited data available regarding venire and trial jury
demographics. The court, through its vast rulemaking power,
should act to cure this defect by requiring the respective circuits to
report on jury demographics both for petit juries and for venires.
Such a procedure will have the additional benefit of satisfying the
court that the Taylor cross-section requirements are being met in
Florida.
There appears to be a substantial difference between the reality
and public perception regarding minority participation on trial ju-
ries. The limited data suggests that blacks are serving on trial ju-
ries to a larger degree than expected. " The media bears some re-
sponsibility for educating minority segments of the public
regarding the realities of the criminal justice system. 47 The
problems generated by the exceptional cases, such as Alvarez and
other highly visible trials, 4 ' will be minimized by the effect of Neil
145. Fla. SB 748 (1984) and a companion bill, Fla. HB 91 (1984), which would have
created FLA. STAT. § 913.18, provided:
(1) A presumption of discrimination is created if any identifiable minority,
ethnic, social, or gender group is excluded from jury service by three-fourths of
the preemptory [sic] challenges used by the state attorney or assistant state attor-
ney. Such presumption may be overcome by the showing by the state of an over-
riding state interest.
(2) If the state fails to meet its burden in overcoming the presumption of dis-
crimination, the court may disallow a challenge or take other appropriate action.
146. See supra notes 143-44.
147. See Circuit Court jury system is racially balanced, supra note 144; Bias on the
Jury, supra note 144.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 140-45; Brief of Amici Curiae, The Florida
State Conference of Branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and Common Cause of Florida at 4-12, Neil v. State, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
1984).
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and by following the recommendations contained in this article.
A substantial reduction in the number of peremptory challenges
available to the parties 49 and renewed recognition by trial courts
of appropriate challenges for cause would enhance minority partic-
ipation without the necessity of completely eliminating peremptory
challenges. The courts, as well as commentators, recognize that
"[a]ll people have biases and opinions that will inevitably influence
their decisions and perceptions, including those on jury duty. The
Supreme Court has recognized this in cases in which it finds that
jury selection procedures must assure a 'fair possibility for ob-
taining a representative cross section of the community.' ""o Pro-
fessor Babcock states, "The ideal that the peremptory serves is
that the jury not only should be fair and impartial but should seem
to be so to those whose fortunes are at issue."'' In the search for
an impartial jury the wisdom of Mr. Justice Cardozo seems partic-
ularly appropriate: "But justice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true." 152 Florida courts, when addressing the peremptory challenge
issue, must continue to "keep the balance true."
149. Among the recommendations made by the Dade County Bar Association Task
Force On Jury Selection (the task force was created as a result of public concern about the
selection of all-white juries in several well-publicized trials) is the recommendation that the
number of peremptory challenges be reduced for both the state and the defense. Two other
recommendations are that the state be given fewer challenges than the defense and that a
multiple number of challenges in multi-defendant cases should not be allowed. See Dade
urged to overhaul jury system, Miami News, Sept. 18, 1984, at 1A, col. 1.
150. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545,
551 (1975) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
151. Babcock, supra note 150, at 552.
152. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
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